Candidate experience matters in elections, but not the way you think

Previously holding political office is an obvious advantage for candidates seeking votes. SDI Productions/E+/Getty Images

Charlie Hunt, Boise State University

Ever since he was chosen as Donald Trump’s running mate back in July, U.S. Sen. JD Vance, a Republican from Ohio, has come under a level of scrutiny typical for a vice presidential candidate, including for some of his eyebrow-raising public statements made in the past or during the campaign.

One line of critique has persisted through the news cycles: that his lack of political experience may make Vance less qualified than others, including his opponent, Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota, to be vice president.

Do more politically experienced politicians have advantages in elections? And if they enjoyed such advantages in the past, do they still in such a polarized political moment?

The answers are complicated, but political science offers some clues.

Why experience should matter

Previously holding political office, and for a longer period of time, is in some ways an obvious advantage for candidates making the case to potential voters. If you were applying for a job as an attorney, previous legal experience would be favorably looked upon by an employer. The same is true in elections: If you want to run for office, experience as an officeholder could help you perform better at the job you’re asking for.

This approach has been taken by a number of high-profile politicians over the years. For example, in Hillary Clinton’s first campaign for president in 2008, the U.S. senator from New York and future secretary of state made “strength and experience” the centerpiece of her argument to the voters.

Experience also might matter for the same reasons as incumbency – that is, when a candidate is currently holding the office they are seeking in an election. Incumbents typically have much higher name recognition than their challenger opponents, distinct fundraising advantages and, at least in theory, a record of policy achievement on which to base their campaigns. Even for nonincumbents, these advantages are more prevalent for previous officeholders rather than someone who is a newcomer to politics.

Barack Obama and his family on Nov. 4, 2008, the day he won the presidential election, showing that a lack of political experience can be used as a benefit. Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images

Inexperienced, or an ‘outsider’?

But Hillary Clinton was, of course, unsuccessful in her first bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008. She was beaten by a relatively inexperienced candidate named Barack Obama; like Vance, Obama had served less than a full term in the Senate before running for higher office.

Obama’s 2008 win shows that a lack of political experience can be leveraged as a benefit.

One of the few things Obama and Donald Trump have in common is that both benefited from an appeal to voters as a political “outsider” in elections in which Americans were frustrated with the political status quo. As outsiders, they appeared uniquely positioned to fix what voters believed was wrong with politics.

Does experience equal ‘quality’?

The “outsider” label isn’t always a ticket to victory.

In 2020, for example, voters were frustrated with the chaos of having a political outsider in the White House and turned to Joe Biden – possibly the most experienced presidential candidate in modern history at that point, with eight years as vice president and several decades in the Senate under his belt. Voters were hungry for political normalcy in the White House and made that choice for Biden.

Does U.S. Sen. JD Vance’s lack of political experience make him less qualified than his opponent, Gov. Tim Walz of Minnesota, to be vice president? Scott Olson/Getty Images

Political science has other important lessons about when experience matters and when it doesn’t. In Congress, electoral challengers – those running against incumbents – enjoy more of a boost from prior experience in places such as the state legislature. In fact, the typical indicator for challenger “quality” used in political science research is a simple marker of whether the challenger has prior political experience.

But even this finding is more complicated than it seems: Political scientists such as Jeffrey Lazarus have found that high-quality – that is, politically experienced – challengers do better in part because they are more strategic in waiting for better opportunities to run in winnable races.

Experience matters only sometimes – and maybe less than ever

The usefulness of a lengthy political resume also depends on which stage of the election candidates are in.

Research has found, for example, that a candidate’s experience matters much more in settings such as party primaries, where differences between the candidates on policy issues are typically much narrower. That leaves nonpolicy differences such as experience to play a bigger role.

In the general election, voters supportive of one party are unlikely to factor candidate experience in that heavily, even, or especially, when the candidate they support lacks it.

The political science phenomenon known as negative partisanship means that, more and more, voters are motivated not by positive attributes of their own party’s candidates but rather by the fear of losing to the other side. This has only been exacerbated as the two parties have polarized further.

Voters are therefore more willing than ever to lower the standards they might have for their favored candidates’ resumes if it means beating the other side. Even if a Democrat is clearly more qualified than a Republican in terms of political experience, that advantage is unlikely to sway many Republican voters, and vice versa.

What about 2024?

In 2024, the experience factor is complicated. Trump, of course, has been president before – the ultimate prior experience for someone running for exactly that office.

But he has continued to run as an outsider from the political establishment, casting Kamala Harris – who, as vice president, has little actual institutional power – as an incumbent who is responsible for the current state of the country. Since polls show consistently that a majority of Americans believe the country is not headed in the right direction, we can see why Trump might try to frame the race in this way.

Whether Trump’s strategy ends up working will be more apparent after the election is over. For now, Trump and Harris can rest assured that most of their supporters don’t appear to care how much – or how little – experience they have.

Charlie Hunt, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boise State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

In a new era of campus upheaval, the 1970 Kent State shootings show the danger of deploying troops to crush legal protests

Ohio National Guard soldiers move in on war protesters at Kent State University on May 4, 1970. AP Photo

Brian VanDeMark, United States Naval Academy

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has expressed his intention, if elected to a second term, to use the U.S. armed forces to suppress domestic protests. The New York Times reports that Trump’s allies are marshaling legal arguments to justify using National Guard or active-duty military troops for crowd control.

Moreover, as the Times notes, Trump has asserted that if he returns to the White House, he will dispatch such forces without waiting for state or local officials to request such assistance.

I am a historian who has written several books about the Vietnam War, one of the most divisive episodes in our nation’s past. My new book, “Kent State: An American Tragedy,” examines a historic clash on May 4, 1970, between anti-war protesters and National Guard troops at Kent State University in Ohio.

The confrontation escalated into violence: Troops opened fire on the demonstrators, killing four students and wounding nine others, including one who was paralyzed for life.

In my view, the prospect of dispatching troops in the way that Trump proposes chillingly echoes actions that led up to the Kent State shootings. Some active-duty units, as well as National Guard troops, are trained today to respond to riots and violent protests – but their primary mission is still to fight, kill, and win wars.

Archival footage from CBS News of the clash between campus anti-war protesters and Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University on May 4, 1970.

Federalizing the Guard

The National Guard is a force of state militias under the command of governors. It can be federalized by the president during times of national emergency or for deployment on combat missions overseas. Guardsmen train for one weekend per month and two weeks every summer.

Typically, the Guard has been deployed to deal with natural disasters and support local police responses to urban unrest, such as riots in Detroit in 1967, Washington in 1968, Los Angeles in 1965 and 1992, and Minneapolis and other cities in 2020 after the death of George Floyd.

The 1807 Insurrection Act grants presidents authority to use active-duty troops or National Guard forces to restore order within the United States. However, presidents rarely deploy Guard troops without state governors’ consent.

The main modern exceptions occurred during the Civil Rights Movement, when Southern governors resisted federal orders to desegregate schools in Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama. In each case, the troops were sent to protect Black students from crowds of white protesters.

The standoff at Kent State

The war in Vietnam had grown increasingly unpopular by early 1970, but protests intensified on April 30 when President Richard Nixon authorized expanding the conflict into Cambodia. At Kent State, after a noontime anti-war rally on campus on May 1, alcohol-fueled students harassed passing motorists in town and smashed storefront windows that night. On May 2, anti-war protesters set fire to the building where military officers trained Kent State students enrolled in the armed forces’ Reserve Officer Training Corps program.

In response, Republican Gov. Jim Rhodes dispatched National Guard troops, against the advice of university and many local officials, who understood the mood in the town of Kent and on campus far better than Rhodes did. County prosecutor Ron Kane had vehemently warned Rhodes that deploying the National Guard could spark conflict and lead to fatalities.

Nonetheless, Rhodes – who was trailing in an impending Republican primary for a U.S. Senate seat – struck the pose of a take-charge leader who wasn’t going to be pushed around by a long-haired rabble. “We’re going to put a stop to this!” he shouted, pounding the table at a press conference in Kent on May 3.

Hundreds of National Guard troops were deployed across town and on campus. University officials announced that further rallies were banned. Nonetheless, on May 4, some 2,000 to 3,000 students gathered on the campus Commons for another anti-war rally. They were met by 96 National Guardsmen, led by eight officers.

There was an edge of confrontation in the air as student anger over Nixon’s expansion of the war blended with resentment over the Guard’s presence. Protesters chanted antiwar slogans, shouted epithets at the Guardsmen and made obscene gestures.

Doug Guthrie, a student at Kent State in 1970, looks back 54 years later at the events of May 4.

‘Fire in the air!’

The Guardsmen sent to Kent State had no training in de-escalating tension or minimizing the use of force. Nonetheless, their commanding officer that day, Ohio Army National Guard Assistant Adjutant General Robert Canterbury, decided to use them to break up what the Department of Justice later deemed a legal assembly.

In my view, it was a reckless judgment that inflamed an already volatile situation. Students started showering the greatly outnumbered Guardsmen with rocks and other objects. In violation of Ohio Army National Guard regulations, Canterbury neglected to warn the students that the Guardsmens’ rifles were loaded with live ammunition.

As tension mounted, Canterbury failed to adequately supervise his increasingly fearful troops – a cardinal responsibility of the commanding officer on the scene. This fundamental failure of leadership increased confusion and resulted in a breakdown of fire control discipline – officers’ responsibility to maintain tight control over their troops’ discharge of weapons.

When protesters neared the Guardsmen, platoon sergeant Mathew McManus shouted “Fire in the air!” in a desperate attempt to prevent bloodshed. McManus intended for troops to shoot above the students’ heads to warn them off. But some Guardsmen, wearing gas masks that made it hard to hear amid the noise and confusion, only heard or reacted to the first word of McManus’ order, and fired at the students.

The troops had not been trained to fire warning shots, which was contrary to National Guard regulations. And McManus had no authority to issue an order to fire if officers were nearby, as they were.

Many National Guardsmen who were at Kent State on May 4 later questioned why they had been deployed there. “Loaded rifles and fixed bayonets are pretty harsh solutions for students exercising free speech on an American campus,” one of them told an oral history interviewer. Another plaintively asked me in a 2023 interview, “Why would you put soldiers trained to kill on a university campus to serve a police function?”

A fighting force

National Guard equipment and training have improved significantly in the decades since Kent State. But Guardsmen are still troops who are fundamentally trained to fight, not to control crowds. In 2020, then-National Guard Bureau Chief General Joseph Lengyel told reporters that “the civil unrest mission is one of the most difficult and dangerous missions … in our domestic portfolio.”

In my view, the tragedy of Kent State shows how critical it is for authorities to be thoughtful in responding to protests, and extremely cautious in deploying military troops to deal with them. Force is inherently unpredictable, often uncontrollable, and can lead to fatal mistakes and lasting human suffering. And while protests sometimes break rules, they may not be disruptive or harmful enough to merit responding with force.

Aggressive displays of force often heighten tensions and worsen situations. Conversely, research shows that if protesters perceive authorities are behaving with restraint and treating them with respect, they are more likely to remain nonviolent. The shooting at Kent State demonstrates why force should be an absolute last resort in dealing with protests – and one fraught with grave risks.

Brian VanDeMark, Professor of History, United States Naval Academy

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

SpaceX’s Elon Musk endorsed Donald Trump for president – what this could mean for US space policy

Elon Musk’s ties with Donald Trump could affect how the former president would approach U.S. space policy. Saul Martinez via Getty Images

Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Johns Hopkins University

Elon Musk officially endorsed Donald Trump for president of the United States on July 13, 2024, shortly after Trump survived an assassination attempt. Musk, a billionaire technology entrepreneur, has made groundbreaking contributions in multiple industries, particularly space travel and exploration.

Even before Musk’s endorsement, Trump was reportedly considering giving the billionaire an advisory role if elected for a second term. With Musk’s public support and financial backing, it now seems even more likely that Trump would offer him an official position in his administration.

As someone who studies space and international relations, I am interested in how Musk might influence U.S. space policy if Trump wins in November. Their partnership could significantly shape the future of U.S. space exploration and defense, as well as shift the balance of power between the public and private sectors in space.

Current US space policy

A nation’s space policy reflects its vision and priorities for outer space. U.S. space policy – a mix of continuity from past administrations and recent directives – is outlined in key documents, including the U.S. National Space Policy, the U.S. Space Priorities Framework, Space Policy Directives and other official publications.

Current space policy emphasizes maintaining U.S. leadership in space, protecting U.S. space assets and working with commercial and international partners to promote safe, secure and responsible behavior in space. Its key elements include growing the American commercial space sector and returning astronauts to the Moon.

Musk’s company SpaceX has been instrumental in advancing these goals, supporting both NASA and the U.S. Space Force – the newest branch of the U.S. military – in their missions. SpaceX’s innovations, such as the reusable Falcon 9 rockets, the Starlink satellite internet and the powerful Starship, have dramatically transformed access to and use of outer space.

The 2016-2020 Trump administration advanced many of the current U.S. space policy goals, some of which closely align with Musk’s own ambitions for space.

Space synergy: Trump’s and Musk’s shared ambitions

Trump and Musk agree on three main objectives in space.

First, both are committed to human expansion beyond Earth. Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1, signed on Dec. 11, 2017, set the U.S. on a course to return astronauts to the Moon and establish a permanent presence there, followed by human missions to Mars and beyond.

This directive aligns with Musk’s vision of colonizing Mars, which is guiding the development of Starship: the most powerful and massive spacecraft ever built. Designed to be fully reusable, Starship will carry large payloads and be capable of deep space travel – including lunar landings and journeys to the red planet.

SpaceX tested its Starship rocket for a fourth time in July 2024. AP Photo/Eric Gay

NASA’s Artemis program, which originated from Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1, plans to return humans to the Moon by 2026. To achieve this goal, NASA partnered with SpaceX in 2021 to develop the Starship Human Landing System spacecraft, which will transport astronauts and cargo from lunar orbit to the Moon’s surface and back.

NASA’s Artemis program plans to return humans to the Moon by 2026.

Second, both Trump and Musk support commercial involvement in space. Trump’s Space Policy Directive 1 specifically calls for commercial and international partnerships, marking a shift from the previous administration. President Joe Biden has continued this push to develop a robust commercial U.S. space sector.

This recognition of the pivotal role that private industries can play in space exploration aligns with Musk’s record as an entrepreneur and innovator. Under Musk, SpaceX has not only provided essential services to NASA, but it has also driven innovation to new heights. The company has significantly lowered the cost of space ventures and made space more accessible to a broader audience of space explorers.

Third, both favor deregulation. Trump’s administration sought to reduce regulatory barriers through directives like his Space Policy Directive 2, which aimed to streamline commercial space regulations to encourage faster growth and innovation in the private space industry.

Even so, Musk has often found existing space regulations too restrictive. He has frequently challenged U.S. regulators – such as the Federal Aviation Administration which oversees launch and reentry requirements – and has called for “comprehensive deregulation.”

Contrasting space visions: Musk vs. Trump

In terms of space priorities, Musk differs from Trump in three main aspects.

First, Musk is focused on the long-term goal of making humanity a multi-planetary species, starting with colonizing Mars and establishing a self-sustaining human presence there.

In contrast, Trump’s approach to space emphasized asserting U.S. leadership by achieving near-Earth and near-term milestones, like returning Americans to the Moon. Consequently, during his presidency, Trump prioritized the Artemis program and launched the Space Force to safeguard U.S. capabilities in space.

Second, while both value the private sector, Musk, through SpaceX, has pushed for cost reduction, innovation and rapid iteration in space technology. SpaceX’s Falcon rockets have reflown some 300 times, significantly cutting spaceflight costs. SpaceX also achieved major milestones in commercial spaceflight, including becoming the first private company to send astronauts to the International Space Station.

In contrast, to fund the Artemis program, Trump called for a significant increase in NASA’s budget. This move emphasized investing in government-led programs to achieve space objectives.

Third, Musk appears more open to sharing patented information, even with his competitors. He famously stated that “patents are for the weak,” arguing that they block innovation and stifle progress. While Musk continues to patent inventions, including those related to SpaceX, he has also expressed support for fostering innovation through openness and collaboration.

In contrast, Trump’s space policy focused on national security and strategic competition. The creation of the Space Force reflected Trump’s view of space as a contested, military domain where the U.S. must protect its assets and maintain a competitive advantage.

Musk’s likely impact on future US space policy

If Musk were to take on a larger, formal role in a second Trump administration, he would likely push for ambitious space missions and timelines. The initial focus would continue to be on the Artemis program and lunar settlements, with increased attention eventually shifting to human missions to Mars and beyond.

Donald Trump and Elon Musk chat at the White House in 2017. Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

A Trump-Musk partnership would likely further advance the commercialization of space. Musk could advocate for more deregulation of space activities, potentially challenging existing safety and security standards. While Musk is also likely to push for cost reduction, innovation and efficiency, it would be interesting to see how his efforts would fare against government bureaucracy.

Whether Musk would affect U.S. space policy regarding international competitors like China remains uncertain. Musk’s presence in a second Trump administration could, however, shed light on whether commercial space actors can help decrease tensions between countries in space.

Musk is not a politician. He is a visionary and problem solver focused on the future of humanity. These qualities are also most likely to shape his impact on U.S. space policy.

Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Assistant Professor of Space and International Relations, Johns Hopkins University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

Supreme Court makes prosecution of Trump on obstruction charge more difficult, with ruling to narrowly define law used against him and Jan. 6 rioters

The Supreme Court faced a decision in a case involving participants in the Jan. 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot. AP Photo/John Minchillo, File

Riley T. Keenan, University of Richmond

The indictments – and in some cases, the convictions – of hundreds of people charged with participating in the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, will have to be reconsidered, and possibly dropped, because of a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2024. Among those charged using a broad interpretation of the obstruction law now narrowed by the high court: former President Donald Trump.

In its decision in Fischer v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute that prohibits obstructing an official proceeding may not apply to three defendants who were charged with participating in the U.S. Capitol riot. Although former President Donald Trump is not a defendant in the case, special counsel Jack Smith has charged him separately with violating the same statute.

As a law professor who teaches and writes in the fields of constitutional law and federal courts, I’ll explain what the court’s decision means for Jan. 6 defendants – and for Smith’s case against Trump.

Charges against Capitol rioters

According to their indictments, Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang and Garret Miller were present at the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. Prosecutors say that all three men entered the Capitol building and assaulted police officers during the riot. One of the men, Lang, brandished a bat and a stolen police shield, and another, Miller, later called for the assassination of U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on social media.

Federal prosecutors charged the three men with various crimes, including assault on a federal officer, disorderly conduct on the Capitol grounds and obstructing a congressional proceeding. That last charge is the one at issue in the Supreme Court appeal.

Before trial, the defendants argued that the law the prosecutors had used to charge them with obstruction applied only to evidence tampering, not the violent disruption of a congressional proceeding. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and sent the case back for trial.

The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case, putting the trial on hold while it considered the dispute over the scope of the obstruction law.

Defining a catch-all term

In a 6-3 opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and held that the statute prohibits only evidence tampering. It then sent the case back to the appeals court to decide whether the defendants violated the law under that narrower reading by trying to prevent Congress from receiving and certifying the states’ true electoral votes.

The court began with the text of the obstruction law. The law penalizes anyone who “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object” or who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding.” The government argued that the defendants had “otherwise obstruct(ed)” proceedings in Congress to certify the results of the 2020 election.

But the court rejected that argument, holding that the phrase “otherwise obstructs” refers only to obstruction that – like altering, destroying, mutilating or concealing a record, document or object – impairs the availability or integrity of evidence for use in an official proceeding. The law’s catch-all for “otherwise obstructing” an official proceeding must be read in common with the list of actions that precedes it, the court explained. Otherwise, the list would be redundant.

The court also pointed to the law’s historical background. Congress, the court explained, enacted this specific obstruction law in 2002 in the wake of the Enron accounting fraud scandal. Its aim was to fill a gap in the nation’s existing obstruction laws, which at the time prohibited directing a third party to destroy incriminating evidence but not destroying the evidence oneself.

The government’s reading of the law, the court explained, would stretch it far beyond that purpose, prohibiting forms of obstruction that had nothing to do with evidence and that Congress never intended to criminalize.

What this means for Jan. 6 defendants – and for Trump

The Supreme Court, from left in front row: Sonia Sotomayor, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan; and from left in back row: Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Alex Wong/Getty Images

The Supreme Court’s decision does not end the case against the Fischer defendants, who will likely stand trial on their assault and disorderly conduct charges.

But it may lead to the dismissal of obstruction charges, or reversal of obstruction convictions, for other Jan. 6 defendants. According to an NPR database, federal prosecutors have charged at least 250 other defendants with obstruction of an official proceeding, and 128 have been convicted.

The ruling may also undermine special counsel Jack Smith’s case against former President Donald Trump, whom Smith has charged with obstruction under the same law. If that case survives a separate pending Supreme Court appeal, the former president will likely seek dismissal of that charge.

Trump may not succeed, however, as the obstruction charge against him is based in part on the allegation that he organized slates of electors to certify false election results to Congress. That may amount to impairing the integrity of the evidence used in the certification proceedings.

And the obstruction charge is also not the only count the former president faces. But the ruling may narrow the case and make it more difficult for the special counsel to present evidence to the jury concerning the violence that occurred on Jan. 6. Under this new ruling, that violence alone may not count as obstruction.

The Fischer case also shows how sometimes, especially in high-stakes cases, the justices can use methods of legal reasoning that they are quick to criticize in other contexts. In the opinion, members of the Supreme Court’s conservative majority cited the legislative history of the obstruction law – evidence that conservative jurists such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia often called unreliable.

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Fischer case may have a profound effect on the special counsel’s historic prosecution of former President Trump.

But even if it does not, it still sheds important light on the court’s inner workings and the federal government’s power to safeguard the integrity of its proceedings.

Riley T. Keenan, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

A campaign-defining presidential debate

U.S. President Joe Biden and Donald Trump participate in the CNN Presidential Debate on June 27, 2024. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Mary Kate Cary, University of Virginia and Karrin Vasby Anderson, Colorado State University

With four months to go until Election Day, the earliest-ever general election debate featured two presidents – one current, one former – and a lot of bitter personal attacks. Joe Biden’s universally acknowledged poor performance surprised and even panicked Democrats; Donald Trump gave a more forceful – if not truthful – performance.

The Conversation asked two scholars, Mary Kate Cary and Karrin Vasby Anderson, to watch the debate and analyze a passage or a moment that stood out to them. Anderson is a communications scholar with a specialty in gender and the presidency, as well as political pop culture. Cary teaches political speechwriting and worked as a White House speechwriter for President George H.W. Bush, for whom she wrote more than 100 addresses.

President Joe Biden speaks during the CNN debate against Donald Trump on June 27, 2024, in Atlanta. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Karrin Vasby Anderson, Colorado State University Department of Communication Studies

One of the first definitions of good public speaking I learned as a college debater and student of rhetoric came from the ancient Roman scholar and rhetoric teacher Quintilian. In his 12-volume “Institutio Oratoria,” Quintilian said the ideal orator was a good person, speaking well. He was particularly concerned about the danger that a skilled rhetorician who lacked character could pose to society.

A presidential debate ought to showcase ideal orators – skilled speakers who are also people of character. The June 27 debate offered voters an either-or scenario.

Former President Donald Trump was aggressive, confident and disciplined, but he peppered his remarks with a steady stream of lies, half-truths and misinformation. President Joe Biden focused on Trump’s documented record – both criminal and political – but failed as an orator, demonstrating none of the charisma and command on display during his most recent State of the Union address just four months ago.

The contrast was clear early in the debate when CNN’s Dana Bash asked Trump whether he would block access to abortion medication. Trump said that he would not. He then falsely claimed that, in the lead-up to the 2022 Supreme Court decision that overturned Roe v. Wade and removed the federal protection for abortion rights, “everybody wanted to get it back to the states, everybody, without exception.”

Trump then went on offense, accusing Democrats of taking “the life of a child in the eighth month, ninth month, even after birth.”

Biden’s response was initially clear and resolute: “It’s been a terrible thing, what you’ve done,” he said. And he pushed back against the preposterous claim that “everybody” wanted Roe v. Wade overturned, saying, “the idea that states are able to do this is a little like saying we’re going to turn civil rights back to the states (and) let each state have a different rule.”

But the rest of Biden’s response was muddled. After “veering inexplicably” into an anecdote about a woman murdered by an undocumented immigrant, Biden expressed his support for people’s right to choose by saying on three separate occasions that the decision should be up to a doctor, rather than the pregnant person.

Trump closed out the segment by reiterating his blatant lie in stronger terms: “So that means, he can take the life of the baby, in the ninth month and even after birth because some states, Democrat run, take it after birth.” The Associated Press’s fact check of this claim is succinct: “Infanticide is criminalized in every state, and no state has passed a law that allows killing a baby after birth.”

After nearly a decade of exposure to Trump’s habitual misinformation, lies about states murdering babies may not stand out as shocking in a presidential debate. And, certainly, it’s an argument that should have been easy for Biden to refute.

But if the populace must choose between a good person and someone who spoke well, Quintilian would remind us that someone who speaks well but has no integrity is dangerous.

The consequences for the republic could be dire.

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump answers a question during the first debate of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

Mary Kate Cary, University of Virginia Department of Politics

I think America just saw history being made.

Within 10 minutes, a very hoarse President Joe Biden, was asked about deficit spending, lost his train of thought, and ended his answer by muttering something about “beating Medicare.” It was awful.

There were so many moments when Biden looked confused and unable to process what was happening. I took notes on key exchanges, but the number of embarrassing episodes, unfinished sentences and incoherent phrases by Biden is too long to list. His answer on why he should be president in his 80s somehow veered into computer chips being made in South Korea.

Former President Donald Trump made his own share of missteps, but overall, he was relatively sharp, and restrained when he was provoked. He scored some points on the issues and did much better than he did in their first debate four years ago. Trump did better than I think many people thought he would.

Our assignment tonight was to find a moment to react to and put it in context. I’ve been to multiple presidential debates and watched many more on television over the years, and have never seen anything like this.

Is there any way the Democrats can convincingly argue for keeping Biden as their nominee?

The bottom line: Moderators Jake Tapper and Dana Bash did a good job of asking substantive questions and keeping control of the debate; Trump missed an opportunity to knock it out of the park but got through it; and Biden will most likely have caused a disaster for the Democratic Party.

Mary Kate Cary, Adjunct Professor of Politics and Director of Think Again, University of Virginia and Karrin Vasby Anderson, Professor of Communication Studies, Colorado State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

Biden’s immigration order won’t fix problems quickly – 4 things to know about what’s changing

Undocumented migrants in Jacumba, Calif., are detained by U.S. Border Patrol officers on June 4, 2024. Katie McTiernan/Anadolu via Getty Images

Jean Lantz Reisz, University of Southern California

Immigration is a top issue in the upcoming presidential election – and President Joe Biden’s new executive order restricting migrants’ ability to apply for asylum is likely to further elevate the subject in national politics.

The number of undocumented migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border has soared in recent years, with 249,785 arrests taking place along the border in December 2023. That marks a 13% rise from the 222,018 migrants arrested by the Border Patrol along the U.S.-Mexico border in December 2022.

Jean Lantz Reisz, an immigration law scholar at the University of Southern California, explains four key things to know about how this executive order will take effect and influence immigration trends.

President Joe Biden speaks about his executive order limiting asylum on June 4, 2024, at the White House. Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

1. The executive order is basically an asylum ban

Biden announced his executive order on June 4, 2024. It prevents everyone who crosses the U.S.-Mexico border without a visa, and not passing through an official port of entry, from seeking asylum. It goes into effect when the number of people crossing the U.S.-Mexico border each day exceeds an average of 2,500.

There have generally been more than 2,500 people without visas crossing the U.S.-Mexico border for each day of Biden’s entire presidency.

Effectively, this is a ban on asylum, meaning the legal right for undocumented immigrants to remain in the U.S. because of the harm they face in their home countries.

Under Biden’s order, some undocumented migrants who express a fear of returning to their home countries may be eligible for other kinds of legal protections – for example, legal protections intended for torture survivors.

In order to get this special legal protection, migrants would have to show U.S. border and immigration officials a lot of evidence outlining the danger they would face in their home countries. They would need to show more evidence than is required for asylum-seekers. Migrants will generally not have this evidence on hand and, as a result, will not receive any kind of legal protection or chance to stay in the U.S.

Over the past decade, including during Biden’s presidency, approximately two-thirds of people who applied for asylum while they were in deportation proceedings were granted asylum or another kind of legal protection that allowed them to stay in the U.S., according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a data organization at Syracuse University.

Biden’s order means that many individuals who previously would have been entitled to asylum, per U.S. law, will now be expelled to Mexico or their home countries without the opportunity to apply for asylum.

2. This could lead to a rise in undocumented minors crossing the border solo

Many individuals who reach the U.S.-Mexico border and cross into the U.S. without a visa or an online appointment to meet with U.S. Customs and Border Protection will be quickly turned back and deported to Mexico or returned to their home countries. The U.S. will need cooperation from Mexico to be able to turn back non-Mexican citizens to Mexico. Mexico currently accepts Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan citizens deported from the U.S.

In December 2023, about one-fourth of the migrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border were from Mexico, while another one-fourth were from El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras. The largest group of apprehended migrants were from other countries, including Venezuela and China.

Biden’s order will not apply to people who are under 18 and cross the U.S.-Mexico border without a parent or guardian. These children will be detained and placed in deportation proceedings where they can seek asylum or other immigration protections.

This creates the risk that desperate parents will send their children alone across the border. This happened from March 2020 through May 2023, when COVID-19-related border restrictions, called Title 42, similarly banned undocumented immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border from seeking asylum. This restriction did not apply to unaccompanied minors. It resulted in a sharp spike in undocumented minors crossing the U.S. southern border from 2020 through 2023.

3. Biden is taking a page out of Donald Trump’s book

Biden is basing this executive order, in part, on an immigration statute called 212(f), which gives the president very broad authority to suspend the entry of certain noncitizens because it would be “detrimental” to U.S. interests.

Former President Donald Trump cited this law when he implemented a travel ban that temporarily suspended the entry of noncitizens from seven countries, including five Muslim-majority countries, in 2017. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the third version of this ban as being lawful in 2018. Biden reversed the ban in 2021.

Migrants, mostly from Central America, wait in line to cross the border from Matamoros, Mexico, to Brownsville, Texas, on June 4, 2024. Chandan Khanna/AFP via Getty Images

4. The executive order won’t be so easy to implement

Biden’s ability to actually reduce the number of migrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border without a visa or any other kind of authorization will depend on several factors.

The president will need Mexico to accept more deported citizens of different countries in order for the U.S. to swiftly turn away migrants. U.S. Border Patrol and immigration agencies have also been overwhelmed by the large influx of undocumented migrants crossing the border. They cannot easily apprehend and screen all migrants or quickly respond to migrants’ applications to stay in the U.S. in immigration courts, which have a historic and massive backlog.

Quickly processing and deporting migrants back to their home countries will also be an obstacle that could limit the order’s effectiveness. U.S. immigration officials will first need to determine whether someone who states a fear of returning to their country qualifies for other kinds of legal protection that are not asylum.

Deporting a Mexican citizen or a Cuban, Venezuelan, Nicaraguan or Haitian citizen can be done quickly and easily, since Mexico will accept them. Deporting migrants from other countries would require their governments to help them get the necessary travel documents and, in most cases, arrange airplane flights.

Still, Biden’s order may deter many migrants who plan to cross the border in the hopes of being allowed to remain in the U.S. and seek asylum.

Jean Lantz Reisz, Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director, USC Immigration Clinic, University of Southern California

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 

Yes, Donald Trump has a point about political prosecution

Donald Trump speaks to the media during a break in his criminal trial in New York on May 30, 2024. Michael M. Santiago/Pool/AFP via Getty Images

Ronald Sievert, Texas A&M University

The facts and the law behind New York District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s successful prosecution of Donald Trump could be argued at length. But as a government prosecutor for 30 years, I have been most interested in the ethics of prosecuting that case.

Outside the courthouse after the verdict, Trump said, “This was a disgrace.” That echoes comments made over the year since his indictment in the case in which Trump repeatedly claimed the prosecution was “political persecution.”

There’s merit to his point.

Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg speaks during a press conference to discuss his indictment of former President Donald Trump on April 4, 2023. Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images

No one better outlined the important ethical standards that have enabled state and federal prosecutors to maintain an image of integrity and honesty than Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson. In a speech to the nation’s federal prosecutors on April 1, 1940, he noted that prosecutors should select cases where the offense is “most flagrant and the public harm the greatest,” while warning that the prosecutor’s ability to choose defendants is the “most dangerous power.”

Choosing defendants, Jackson said, requires judgment. It is a power that can be abused.

“With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone,” Jackson said. In certain cases, he said, “it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.”

It is when the prosecutor “picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies,” Jackson warned.

For years, as a federal prosecutor, I had been proud to stand up before the juries and announce, “Ron Sievert for the United States.” I believed that the majority of those in the courtroom understood that the federal government traditionally prosecuted cases that were the “most flagrant.” These were cases where, as Jackson said, “the public harm” was “the greatest.”

We prosecutors preserved our reputation of not prosecuting cases for political reasons by only pursuing cases where there were real victims, in the sense of bodily harm or financial loss. The U.S. Department of Justice had an unwritten but long-understood policy of never indicting and trying a politician for a nonviolent crime within one year of an election.

New York’s prosecution of Donald Trump can be, and has been, characterized long before today by some as a “political prosecution” because of the strong belief that a case on an allegedly false record would never have been brought if Trump were not running for president.

Justice Jackson warned that such a case, without an apparent victim, could undermine the public’s perception of the prosecution’s legitimacy. This prosecution may have upset Trump, but the real question is: Will it damage the good faith – both in the United States and internationally – that has been earned for decades by American public prosecutors?

Ronald Sievert, Senior Lecturer in Government, Texas A&M University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Biden and Trump will fight for Michigan’s votes county by county in a state where little things matter a lot

Somali Americans cast their early votes at the Lansing city clerk’s office on November 2, 2020, in Lansing, Michigan. John Moore/Getty Images

Dante Chinni, Michigan State University

Between now and Election Day, journalists are going to spend a lot of time talking about Michigan as one of a group of “crucial battleground states” in the 2024 campaign. There will be stories about the state’s blue-collar roots and the importance of the vote from working-class white people, African Americans, Arab Americans, college students and rural communities.

All of those stories will be true, to some extent, because in the past few elections Michigan has become a state where the little things – low turnout with this voter group, extra enthusiasm with that one – matter a lot.

It wasn’t always this way. Until fairly recently, Michigan was a relatively safe bet, at least in presidential politics. From 1992 to 2012, during six presidential elections, Michigan voted Democratic regardless of what the nation did as a whole. In 2000 and 2004, Republican George W. Bush won the presidency, while Michigan voted for Democrats Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004.

Then Donald Trump changed the state’s electoral equation.

U.S. Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump addresses supporters on Oct. 31, 2016, at Macomb Community College in Warren, Mich. Jeff Kowalsky/AFP via Getty Images

Many puzzle pieces

Republican presidential candidate Trump won the state of Michigan in 2016 by activating specific segments of the electorate. He won with a combination of enthusiasm among some voter groups for him and disdain among others for Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. The evidence of those voter attitudes is all over the results data from 2016.

You can see the enthusiasm for Trump in the results from Macomb and Monroe counties. These are two blue-collar suburban counties around Detroit that we call “middle suburbs” in the American Communities Project, a journalism effort I direct at Michigan State University. These counties are home to many of the autoworkers in the big plants and smaller auto shops around Detroit. Both those counties flipped to Trump in 2016 from Barack Obama in 2012, and both produced more total votes – a sign of Trump’s little-noted, blue-collar suburban surge in 2016.

The disdain for Clinton is apparent in Wayne and Genesee counties, the respective homes of Detroit and Flint, two cities with large African American populations. Clinton still won both Democratic strongholds, but her margins of victory were smaller than Obama’s in 2012, and fewer people voted in each county.

In 2012, Wayne County produced about 818,000 votes, and Obama won it by about 47 percentage points. That was largely in line with recent winning margins by Democratic candidates. The Democratic presidential candidate won the county by 40 points or more in every contest from 2000 to 2012.

In 2016, Wayne County produced only 783,000 votes, and Clinton won it by 37 percentage points. Genesee County followed a similar track. In 2016, it produced 6,000 fewer votes than 2012, and Clinton won it by a relatively meager 9 percentage points, after Obama had won it by 28 percentage points four years earlier.

In 2020, Joe Biden recaptured Michigan, and won the White House, by engaging and reengaging voter groups, particularly African American voters, that didn’t come out in 2016. Turnout in Wayne County spiked to 874,000 votes.

Biden also got bigger turnout and bigger margins out of Washtenaw and Ingham counties, the respective homes of the University of Michigan and Michigan State University, known as “college towns” in the project I run. Trump also saw his margin shrink in blue-collar Macomb County.

The push and pull among these groups will dictate what happens in Michigan this fall. There are a series of key questions and voter groups to watch.

President Joe Biden speaks alongside Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer while visiting a United Auto Workers phone bank in the metropolitan Detroit area on Feb. 1, 2024. Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images

Can Trump or Biden do it again?

Can Biden get big turnout and support among the large African American populations in places such as Flint and Detroit? The early signs suggest there could be concerns here. Polls consistently show low enthusiasm among Black voters.

What about Trump’s support among those blue-collar suburbanites in places such as Macomb and Monroe counties? Those places will almost certainly vote for Trump again this fall, but margins will be key. Since 2016, the political leaning among those voters looks more complicated. There were unenthused Democrats in these communities too in that 2016 race, and since that election they’ve been more likely to come out to vote. For instance, Michigan’s Democratic Gov. Gretchen Whitmer won Macomb in her 2018 campaign and her 2022 reelection. Can Trump recreate his huge 2016 win with those voters in 2024?

Young college-age adults are usually some of the hardest voters to turn out for an election, but, again, they are a key Democratic constituency. Voters in “college town” counties such as Washtenaw and Ingham didn’t show up in big numbers in 2016, but they did in 2020, largely because of their dislike of incumbent Trump. They also came out in droves in 2022 to reelect Whitmer, but that may have been because of a ballot proposal that enshrined abortion rights in the state.

This year, polls show young voters are unenthused about Biden, and there will be no abortion measure on the ballot in Michigan. How does that effect their turnout? Do they even consider voting for Trump or a third-party option because they oppose some Biden policies?

Small shifts can mean a lot

One of the policies that may turn younger voters off is the U.S. government’s position on the Israel-Hamas war in the Middle East, which affects another important voter group in Michigan – Arab American voters.

There has been a lot of attention on this group in the 2024 political coverage of Michigan because of the large concentration of Arab American voters in the state. It’s not a massive population, about 225,000 people in a state of more than 10 million, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

But the state has been close lately, with Trump winning it by about 11,000 votes in 2016 and Biden capturing it by about 150,000 in 2020. Again, in Michigan, small shifts can mean a lot.

Those aren’t all the factors that could influence the election’s outcome, of course. There are a lot of rural counties in the northern parts of Michigan that tend to favor Trump. Even though they don’t produce a lot of votes individually, together they can add up. A surge in turnout there could matter.

There are also the high-income, highly educated suburbanites around Detroit and Grand Rapids who are increasingly voting Democratic.

In short, there are no simple answers. That’s why the election will likely be close. But keep an eye on these voter segments and regions and you’ll get a sense of where things are headed in the complicated jigsaw puzzle that is Michigan this fall.

Dante Chinni, Director, American Communities Project, Michigan State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.